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INTRODUCTION
1. The 90's Recession
Japan's Economic Planning Agency defines the Japanese economic
cycle,as a "business boom and recession"1'According to thisdefinition,
the Japanese economy enjoyed a business boom from February 1983 to
June 1985 (figure 1). After that, the drastic appreciation of the yen
introduced by The Plaza Accord triggered the next severe recession,
which continued until November, 1986. The higher yen, having risen
from 241 yen per dollar to 171 yen, greatly affected Japanese firms
which depended on a large volume of exports. Positive corporate
performances in these years turned negative compared with the
previous year. Even now, a lot of Japanese firms recognize this
recession as one of the most severe changes their business environ-
ment has experienced.
Fortunately, this recession caused from the yen upswing in 1985
recovered quickly,because the Japanese economy subsequently came to
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Figure 1. Length of Past Recessions and Booms in Japan
Figure 2. The Bubble Economy and Drastic Recession
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enjoy the "bubble economy", an unprecedented business boom in
Japan (figure 2). The boom period continued from the end of 1986 to
April, 1991. During this period, the stable yen-dollar rate brought high
performance to export-oriented firms. Furthermore, asset prices, such
as land prices, housing prices and stock prices jumped to unprece-
dented levels and sales of luxury goods took off.
Nevertheless, all the economic indices drastically dropped from their
peak in the former half of 1991. At that point, the bubble economy
collapsed. The "90's recession", which some called "complex reces-
sion", began, from this bubble corruption, the end of which is only now
becoming visible but not so clearly. Japanese industries and firms have
never faced an economic recession so severe. It has generated
tremendous pressure which caused not only product prices but also
value of assets to take a precipitant fall.And it may upset or transform
the whole of the Japanese industrial structure. Even most of the firms
in the automobile and electronics industries, which had been intensi-
fying their international competitiveness throughout the 1980's, have
been forced to change their corporate strategies drastically.
The identifying feature of the 90s recession has been its length,
which has stubbornly eclipsed that of all predecessors, especially as
compared with the recession in 1985 (figure 1). Even before that, the
Japanese economy had faced various recessions which badly influenced
the steady growth of the economy. The firstand the second oilcrisisin
the 1970's caused a sudden rise of commodity prices and a decrease in
corporate performance.
Furthermore, in all of the past recessions, the corporate performance
index of all Japanese firms turned around after two years from the
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Figure 3. Recovery of Corporate Performance after Recessions
peak (figure 3).Thus, the Japanese economy has never experienced four
consecutive years' decline in the corporate performance index, as is
currently the case.
In addition, it is the first time that the production of the Japanese
electronics industry decreased in two consecutive years (figure 4).
Although production dropped by 1.5 percent as compared to the
previous year in 1986, it had turned around within a year. However, in
the 90's recession, production dramatically fell by 12.8% in 1992 and by
5.6% in 1993. During the 1980's because of technological innovation,
prices of electronic products dropped steadily without the influence of
the business cycle. The 90's recession was marked by the fact that not
only production volume, but also prices of products dropped drastically.
Especially, the pressure of falling prices was much more severe than
ever before.
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Figure 4. Production and Price Index of Electronic Products (1985-1994)
2. Research Questions
In spite of the 90's recession, there are a number of companies
whose performance has improved. Why do these companies sustain
high performances in such a severe recession?
In this paper, we would like to clarify the methodologies for
corporate survival through such economic conditions and for creating
core competencies2', with case studies of four typical electronic
component firms in Japan, TDK, ROHM, OMRON and ALPS. All of
these have global competency, furthermore, they have similar features,
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such as size of business,product line and technology structure.We will
discuss the following research questions:
TDK Corporation : Back to Material TechnologyR
1. Changing Strategic Domain in 15 years
TDK was established in 1935 to commercialize ferrite, a versatile
magnetic compound consisting of ferric oxide and one or more other
metallic oxides. TDK's primary business is the development, manufac-
ture and application of materials used to make electronic components,
especially using ferrite technologies. In addition to ferrite,the company
produces dielectric, piezoelectric, semiconductor, metallic and organic
materials, among others. Typical products among electronic components
are ferrite core, multilayer chip components and integrated circuits for
hard-disk drives. Each of these holds a 50% share of the world
market. Typical products among recording media include audiocas-
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settes (30% of world market share4))and videocassettes (20% of world
market share).
For the fiscal year ended March 31, 1995, consolidated net sales were
485.1 billion yen ($5,451 million),while operating profit was 38.1 billion
yen ($431 million).The company has 27,276 employees in Japan and
around the world. Consolidated net sales of electronics materials and
components made up 73% of total sales, with sales of recording media
comprising the remaining 27%. However, the consolidated operating
profit of electronics materials and components accounted for 85% of
total profit, and the profit of recording media only 15%. Thus,
electronic materials and components generated the majority of the
company's profit.
In contrast, TDK's historical strength has been in magnetic tapes.
The TDK brand of audiocassettes and videocassettes is familiar around
the world. The traditional business of magnetic tapes expanded along
with the growth of VCRs and audio decks. In the early 1980s, net sales
of magnetic tapes occupied more than half of total sales of the
company, with operating profit on net sales hovering higher than 20%.
Such high returns made the market very attractive to potential
entrants. In particular, since the videocassette market had a lower
technological barriers to entry than the audiocassette market, major
consumer electronics manufactures such as Hitachi-Maxell, Panasonic,
JVC, and Sony entered the market. At the beginning of the entrance
to the videocassette market, Panasonic and JVC were supplied by TDK
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through OEM (OriginalEquipment Manufacturing),but they quickly began
production themselves. Increasing OEM supply for distributorsexpanded
total supply to the market, which in turn resulted in severe price
competition. As a result, the price of videocassettes dropped
dramatically,graduallylowering TDK's overallprofitability.
Figure 5. TDK: ConsolidatedBusinessMakeup and ProfitRate
The yen's appreciation in 1985 cut profit on sales in half. In fiscal
1986 alone, consolidated operating profit on net sales tumbled from 17%
to 10%. At the same time, overseas sales had reached a level of 48%
of total consolidated net sales. However, the company had not begun to
produce overseas in volumes high enough to combat the yen's dramatic
rise. Thus, the yen's appreciation directly influenced the company's
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profitability. For TDK, this appreciation of the yen from 1985 to 1986
was the most serious change of circumstances in the 15 year period.
TDK intended to overcome the crisis by expanding overseas
production. As a result, the overseas production of recording media,
which includes magnetic tapes, accounted for 52% of total sales in
fiscal 1995, up from 26% in 1990. As overseas sales of recording media
make up 62% of total sales, the overseas production system has nearly
enough capacity to supply all overseas markets. Furthermore, the
company boosted the share of yen-denominated exports from Japan,
mostly to overseas subsidiaries, from 40% to 75% during fiscal 1995.
During the bubble economy from 1987 to 1990, the company's
performance was stable. At that time, top management decided to
redefine the company's strategic businesses. One important strategic
change was the redefinition of the magnetic tape business, which had
long been the heart of TDK's profits, as the recording media business,
broadening significantly its range of output. Another major strategic
decision made at this point concerned the company's long standing
focus on ferrite as its main technological strength. Ferrite, the
company's core technology and center of material technology, would
have to share its position in the company eye with a broad range of
emerging materials technology.
However, TDK faced recession in the 90's and consolidated operating
profit on net sales dropped again. This decline had two root causes.
One was that the company could no longer count on high profitability
in the recording media business as experienced before. The other was
that profitability in the electronic components business was lower than
that previously enjoyed in the area of magnetic tapes. Thus, the
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company saw a need to develop high value-added electronic compo-
nents. TDK felt pressure to change its business structure. The
company succeeded in doing so and accomplished a turnaround by
means of the three strategicactionsoutlined below.
2. Overcoming the 90's recession
(1) Focus on Products
In the bubble economy, like other competitors, TDK executed
"multi-product, small-lot-sized production" according to assemblers'
needs. The company produced allkinds of components intended for all
sorts of electronic products. In fact, during the boom, the company
manufactured 200,000 types of components. At that time, the
company's view was that a broad component line was its responsibility
as a component manufacturer. However, this perceived need to satisfy
even marginal customers with specific,low-volume demands led to
lower profitabilityin the electronic component business. After the
bubble economy, the company stopped increasing its forms of
components other than strong components which could win number the
one or number two positionin each market. Then it focused on
competitive components born of materials technology. In addition, by
integrating plural components , the company succeeded in reducing the
numbers of various component types.
The technologicallystrong products increased the range of TDK's
customers. To that point, TDK had only one sales division,which
handled all the company's products, structured by customer's product
type. For example, TDK's TV sales section handled all types of
components having to do with TV manufacturing. In such a sales
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organization, it was difficult to build specific technical expertise among
the sales staff. Realizing this, the company divided its sales division
into four sections, each corresponding to one of the company's main
business units in April, 1994. This led to closer alignment of the sales
and production divisions.
Consequently, focusing on strategic components and increasing the
number of customers who use each component has enabled the
company work economies of scale. This increase in efficiency has
lowered TDK's break-even point from 90% to 84% over the course of
the 90's recession.
(2) Reduce Fixed Costs
Sales and profits per employee had been deteriorating because of the
increasing number of employees. In order to make the organization
profitable even without net sales growth, TDK rolled out its "MIP
(Management Innovation Plan)" a cost-reduction program. Its initiatives
included aggressive attention to such practices as hiring freezes, the
restructuring of subsidiaries, and the introduction of a flat organiza-
tional structure. With its personnel evaluation program, TDK became
one of the pioneers in changing the traditionalJapanese seniority system
to the merit-based system. The mass-media picked up this action as
one of the current topics in 1992. Efforts such as these enabled the
company to reduce fixed costs (selling, general, and administrative
expenses), from its peak in 1991 by about 20%, to its current levels.
(3) Foster Core Technologies Centering on Materials
The time-consuming and complicated process of developing material
technology act as a formidable barrier to entry, while they in turn
increase the competitive strength of electronic components with high
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levels of materialtechnology. As an example of the levels of technology
being considered, a TDK ceramic capacitor used in cellularphones
contains 220 layers of dielectricsubstance and electrode,but measures
just 3.2x 1.6mm in size.Competitors simply cannot easily analyze the
cost structure and production systems of products consisting of this
kind of material technology.
TDK began to develop material technologies other than ferrite 15
years ago. In the bubble economy, the company categorized these
material technologies into four strategic business fields; magnetic
heads, high-frequency components, optical disks and semiconductors.
At that point,the company strategicallyallocated managerial resources
to these four business fields.As a result,sales of products from four
strategicareas willreach 35% of totalsalesin fiscal1997.
The major problem of seeking new technological seeds is to grow
numbers of R&D projectsin the company's R&D sections.It generates
confusion in management control,and as a result a company cannot
launch new products frequently.In order to develop new products, the
company integrated its R&D sections into "Technical Center" in
Ichikawa city,Chiba prefecture,in 1991. The company's president visits
every week and is keenly committed to R&D activitieshimself.
3. Back to Material Technologies
TDK is now creating core competencies based on its core technolog-
ies. In the bubble economy, the company intended to broaden its
product line and technologicalfield,and the company thought that such
expansion was its responsibilityas a component manufacture. However,
this expansion strategy made resources so widely distributed that it
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could not create a competitive advantage. Facing the 90's recession,
TDK found that only strong products generate profits.
Thus, TDK changed its strategiesfrom mere expansion to taking a
technologicaladvantage. The company focuses on new materials and
new products generated by the core technologies,centering on ferrite.
TDK's strong products appeal to their customers. Nevertheless, even
while having technologicallystrong products, TDK does not aim at the
strongest positionin each market. If it occupies whole shares of a
market, the company must supply components at any time and any
volume according to the assembler's needs. The company introduces
competitors in order to share responsibilitiesfor steady supply.
Such a change can not be accomplished in a day. Needless to say,
the retrenchment during the 90's recession played an important role.
But if there were no redefinitionof strategicfieldsand no developing
new technologies during booms, TDK would stillstick to only ferrite
and magnetic tapes, and it could not have been able to turn around.
ROHM Co., LTD: Developing Flexible Production SystemR
1. Growth Process
ROHM was established in 1954, when Mr. Kenichiro Satoh, the
present CEO of ROHM, acquired a patent right concerning resistors.
Hence it does not have a long history,and is not a matured company.
Since its foundation it has struggled to research and develop
technologies not only concerning resistorsand sensors, but also light
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emitting diodes, condensers, IC and LSI in response to contemporary
market needs. In 1984, ROHM was the first company in the world
developed laser diodes for practical use. As a result, ROHM became a
famous company in the electronic component industry. Thereafter it
implemented large investment for R&D through a public stock offering.
Now the total amount of sales of ROHM, which supplies electronic
components for computers & OA, visual & audio appliances, Automo-
biles and so on to many assemblers, is 2400 billion yen ($2,160 million)
with a secure position as one of the leading electronic components
firms in Japan.
The proportion of overseas sales accounts for 40% of the total,and is
increasing by 3% every year. Also, the export rate of Japanese
production is 34%. Broken down by region, Asia occupies 67%, North
& South America 19%, and Europe and others 14%. As these figures
show, exports to Asia have been rapidly increasing since the early 90's.
This area has become more and more important for ROHM and other
Japanese components firms, because Japanese assemblers have built
their product bases in this area following the economic growth of Asia.
Similarly, Foreign Direct Investment (FDD, mainly for South East Asia
has been increasing since the late 1980's. ROHM has now established
nine production bases, mainly in Asia. Thus, the strategic importance
of Asia is constantly increasing.
2. Transforming Its Structure
(1) Triggers of Strategic Change
At first we shall chronologically look at the strategic process of
ROHM confronting the business cycle of the 80' and 90's. In the early
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80's, the main products supporting ROHM's growth were AV
components. The demand for VCR in the world market amounted to
20 million units annually. Under such market growth conditions,the
company increased its production to supply Japanese VCR assemblers.
As a result,it was able to liststock on the Tokyo Stock Exchange,
Osaka Stock Exchange and Kyoto Stock Exchange since 1984, and
collect money for investment as mentioned before. When the
appreciation of the yen attacked the Japanese economy in 1985, the
company's sales were affected briefly.At that time, ROHM used funds
acquired through the listingstocks for expanding foreign bases and
preparing for future business expansion.
Figure 6. ROHM : ConsolidatedSalesand ProfitRate
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After this yen recession, the Japanese economy rapidly recovered in
1987. With other Japanese companies, ROHM's sales began to increase,
topping 100 billionyen ($1,123 million).However the company's rate of
net profit declined in inverse relation to increasing sales amounts. It
bottomed out at around 3% in 1991, the peak of the bubble economy.
One of the reasons for the fall was the collapse of the business
system which the company used to correlate mass production with
large volume sales. Until 1991, ROHM manufactured many kinds of
components in compliance with assemblers' needs, regardless of the
amount of their orders. The over-adaptation to many assemblers who
used "Just-in-Time" (JIT) methods, without considering the number of
orders caused a large increase in selling overhead, including delivery
cost, sales management cost and so on. It gave birth to the conjunc-
ture "Increasing sales amount, but no profit" and caused net profit to
decrease year by year. Moreover, with the tremendous recession in 1991
and with the market change concerning prices, assemblers forced the
component manufactures to lower their, giving rising to intense price
competition among component makers.
During the sales growth volume mentioned above, the basic strategy
of ROHM was to adapt to the customers' needs, whose numbers were
over 30,000 some of which were very small. Thus, it was inevitable
that rate of net profit declined.
(2) Re-building a Profitable System
In order to defeat aggravating conditions and to build a profitable
business system, ROHM implemented a reorganization plan. The largest
point in this was a reform of the sales system, in which assemblers had
maintained a hegemony. One of the Japanese ways of business was.
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the focus of this organization plan, which was the trade practices
through personal human relationsbetween customers and a salesman,
on the base of the satisfactionof business partners regardless of the
business logic. ROHM reformed its sales organization and business
system including personnel shifting.By abolishing small orders and
adapting to every need overwhelmed the company with internal
conflict,it could reduce indirect costs under the strong leadership of
the CEO.
Furthermore ROHM embarked on the reduction of investment in
plant and equipment without decreasing the amount of sales. During
the period of growth in the late 80's,its investment was for the
purpose of both increasing yield and satisfying"the small quantity but
multiple-items" needs of customers greater than its cash flow.
However such investment lead to the dispersion of business resources
and a shared lack of a strategic viewpoint. After 1991, when the
company implemented large investment, it redefined its investment
principle,which was to confine its investment within the boundary of
cash flow.It goes without saying that if a company does not increase
yieldin compliance with market needs in global competition, not only
growth but also survivalis at risk.Such a company also cannot realize
its reliabilityof supply for customers. Therefore, ROHM pursued a
strategyin which it could make productivitygo up in such a turbulent
business environment.
One of the measures devised to resolve the problem was the use of
overseas production bases. In addition to using production bases
established in the 80's, it began to use overseas sales bases as
InternationalProcurement Offices (IPO) to build a logisticsystem for
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realizing cost reduction. In this way, the periodic global strategic
meeting is presently becoming more important.
On the other hand, in the domestic market, ROHM strives to
specialize in corporate group companies and to construct a system
which divides labor among them. At the same time, it enhances
production flexibility by utilizing its human resources, who are very
familiar with machines. One of the reasons for this is that Kenichiro
Satoh, CEO of ROHM, is a machinery technology specialist. Due to
this, all production equipment in ROHM was made internally, and
ROHM is now able to change its production systems in accordance
with customer needs more easily than its competitors. Thus, It is
possible for ROHM to supply its customers without stopping or
disordering production plans.
3. Beyond Constraints for a Components Manufacturer
It goes without saying that ROHM is influenced by the fluctuation of
the final market, though it does not sell retail products. Under the
conditions of severe price competition and technological changes as
mentioned before, even components manufacturers must scan the
trends of the final market and the strategic movement of assemblers
all over the world, as well as the direction of technological trends. This
leads component manufacturers to ask where will assemblers
products ? ; how big and what kinds of products will they develop in
their business ? ; which technological direction will they pursue in the
future? Gathering and analyzing this information is an indispensable
factor in building competitive edge and assuring reliability of supply to
assemblers. Thus, the reorganization of ROHM's sales system purposely
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against traditionalJapanese ways of business has been effective.
Nevertheless, ROHM cannot gather alltypes of information; and if they
do so, they might revert to the old system which did not allow for net
profit.From this point of view, it was a good decision for ROHM to
focus on the business fieldwhere it can exert its strength and in which
many large assemblers do not enter, while utilizingits flexible
manufacturing system as a weapon.
OMRON Corporation : Supply with ConsultationR
1. Growth Process
OMRON was established in 1933 as a specialty manufacturer of
relays.Presently,it produces not only relays,switches, and timers, but
also programmable controllermechatronic devices and FA computers
for factoryautomation; CCTS, ATMs and cash dispensers for banking
systems; EFTS, area trafficcontrol systems and road trafficcontrol
systems for trafficcontrol systems; PITS, digitalblood cellanalyzers
and electronic thermometers for health-care & medical equipment;
HME, computer hardware and system supplies; OP, and so on. Its
products vary from special-use of electroniccomponents to those found
in the retailproducts which we see in our neighborhoods. One of the
largest driving forces for OMRON's growth was products related to
control components and systems promoting FA after the early 1980's.
In fiscal 1995, total sales of was 489.7 billion yen ($4.4 billion)and net
profit was 33,478 million yen ($300 million).
Since its foundation, the major market for OMRON has been the
Japanese market. It has occupied 80% of OMRON's sales. Consequent-
ly, the yen's appreciation in 1985 did not have great impact on profits,
enabling the company constantly grow until the 1992 recession in
Japan. During this period, the main products were control components
and systems, whose share of OMRON's sales was 50 - 60%.
Figure 7. OMRON: Consolidated Business Makeup and Profit Rate
Organizational corpulence under the condition of such growth
gradually eroded the pioneer spiritof the company's initialera, and it
could not keep its organizational dynamics. In fact, OMRON had
depended on manufacturing products related with control components
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and systems business for 20 years, and it did not create and develop
new business domains, which changed with the traditionalbusiness
process even in the late 80's,as the Japanese economy rapidly grew.
Mr. Kazuma Tateichi,.the founder and CEO at the time, noticed the
syndrome which he named "big-companies-itis (daikigyoubyo)", and
launched an initiativeto transform its corporate constitution and
organizationin 1988.In May 1989, afterone and halfyears of discussion
in the company, OMRON declared its vision for the 21st century,
"Golden 90's(G'90)",and aimed to become the technologicallythe No.l
company in the world. Even now, this vision underlies OMRON's
business strategies.
The polar concept of this vision is "to balance sub-optimum and
total-optimum" and "to enhance each business and corporation as a
whole". In the traditionalmanagement system, the balance of the
corporate as a whole often was neglected, because each department
tended to focus on theirown business and not consider the organization
as a whole. Then the CEO defined the enhancement of strength as a
corporation,through not only strengthening individualbusiness but also
creating synergy by aligningthese businesses.
At the same time, OMRON constructed the global system of dividing
labor for adapting to globalizationin accordance with the vision.It
consisted of four regional head-quarters (RHQ) at the time, though
these become five RHQ with the inclusion of China. Also, against the
rapid yen appreciation since 1994, the company planned to increase the
proportion of overseas production from only 3.4% in 1993 to around 10%
in 1996 when the middle-range plan willfinish,in order to enhance its
global competitiveness.
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2. Toward Realizing G'90
(1) Defining Three Business Domains
OMRON defined three business domains for realizingits G'90 vision.
These are the Micro-Electronics Business (MEB), Service Creation
Business (SCB) and Human Renaissance Business (HRB).
MEB was the business domain which has traditionallysupported
OMRON. This business domain consisted of three businesses,including
the components business, system business and service business. The
components business was based on control components and systems,
and was regarded as the main source of net profitat the time. The
role of the systems business was to promote the construction of
banking systems and FA for expanding the component business.
Moreover, the service business was put in place to create new
customers through supporting the components business.
The main purpose of MEB was to generate synergy though
combining these businesses and to create a core technology which
would be possible to use as a whole. In order to create such a core
technology, OMRON undertook M&A and strategic alliances,and
needless to say the enhancement of basic research internally.Although
many of them succeeded, the collapse of the bubble economy caused
the movement to shake out after 1992.
The second domain which underlies G'90, SCB concerned the
business of supporting stafffunctions of customers. However, this was
not only to help outsourcing of staff tasks which already existed, but
also to propose how to construct the systems to correspond to the
Information Era. That is to say, the concept of this business was to
supply consultationservice realizingfusion of human intelligenceand
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technology through utilizingknow-how accumulated in OMRON.
The third domain, HRB, was a new business for OMRON and it had
many unknown aspects. The business domain whose key concept was
to "satisfy human needs through fusing industrializedsociety and
cultural society", was very wide, and also contained many kinds of
business that had strong future potential. The Human Research
Institute,which was establishedin 1990, has tried to develop the new
domain for the future.
(2) Cost Reduction as A Result of Recession
OMRON advanced the restructuring of its business on the basis of
the vision of G'90, and tried to improve corporate constitution and
profit,which have been declining since 1990. Manufacturing products
depending on control components and systems technology did not
contribute to increasing profit and did not add value, because these
business had presupposed economic growth. In other words, recessionin
the early 90's revealed the dilemma of OMRON caused by dispersing
business resources and ignoring its strength,adapting only to turbulent
market change. From thisview point,specificationof business domain
by G'90 was useful for confirming core-technology and enhancing its
proper strength in areas outside of the core products which had long
been the focus.
Moreover, OMRON established an anti-recession task force and
launched a program to reduce sales management cost and totalasset,
and to reform its logisticssystem for the purpose of management
improvement, in accordance with the intermediate term planning which
started from 1994.
(3) Developing Consulting Sales
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The other strength supporting the growth of OMRON until now was
a strong sales network, in addition to manufacturing a full line of
products related with components and systems control. For OMRON,
whose major competitors have to proud a fullline of products, and are
in Keiretsu relationships, it will be very important to establish de facto
standards globally. Therefore, it is strategically indispensable for the
company to create new markets faster than competitors and to increase
market share as quickly as possible. To do this, OMRON is developing
what it calls "consulting sales". This is sales stressing consultation with
customers. In order to build such a sales system, OMRON needs to
propose how a customer can use its products and what retail products
the customer will need in the future, but not to supply products
following customer needs as in the past. Then strong sales networks of
OMRON will result in becoming one of the most useful weapons for
not only gathering information but predicting future markets.
The current management strategy is to synthesize MEB, SCB and
HRB and begins to focus on core technology. This directly links with
the company's promotion of "consulting sales" for creating high
value-added business. In other words, OMRON's new strategy is
founded on accomplishing its reliabilityof supply to customers through
proposing and creating new ideas.
ALPS ELECTRIC Co., LTD: Optimal Allocation of
Business Resources^
1. Success in Turning Around
ALPS is the leader of electronic component manufactures in Japan.
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The company's rapid growth has paralleledthe increasing demand of
consumer electronicproducts,like audio decks, TVs and VCRs. Among
Japanese electroniccomponent manufactures, it has a presence as the
"department store of electronic components", which means that the
company deals with almost all sorts of electronic components. In
addition,the company has a good reputation among assemblers as the
most reliablemanufacturer. Therefore, it is very difficultfor ALPS to
drasticallychange relationshipsbetween customers and the company.
Figure 8. ALPS: ConsolidatedSalesand ProfitRate
In fiscal 1995, the ALPS group which has 9,510 employees, had
consolidated net sales accounts of 399.7 billionyen ($3,597 million)and
operating profits of 12.9 billion yen ($11.6 million).Broken down by
business field, sales of electronic components occupies 68% of total
sales, with audio products and others comprising the remaining 32%.
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Contrary to this breakdown of sales, in operating profit, the audio
products and others generates 68% of total operating profit. Thus, it
can be seen that the company has an strong incentive to make the
electric components business more profitable.
In surveying the company's sales longitudinally, we see that after
sales slightly declined in the yen's appreciation in 1985, they steadily
grew during the bubble economy. Facing the recession of the 90's,
however, due to decreasing domestic production by assemblers, the
company's domestic sales declined drastically from its peak in 1991. As
ALPS produced almost all of its products in domestic factories,
declining volume of sales and the dropping price of components directly
influenced the company's sales. Paralleling the sales decline, profitability
also dropped, because the company had strength in mass production,
which generated earnings only when the production line was running at
high capacity.
Originally, ALPS had strength in molding technology to produce
components. Robust molds enabled the company to make large
numbers of components in long-runs. The company realized cost
advantages in mass production. Nevertheless, in the 1980's, with the
increasing use of NC (numerical control)machine tools, competitors could
easily make molds for components themselves. In addition, as
assemblers drastically increased types of products, "multi-product,
small-lot-sized production", not mass production, became the
mainstream of component production systems. Under these changing
conditions, the company's strength, robust molds and mass production
systems, lost effectiveness. Thus, after the latter half of the 1980s,
ALPS's profits continued to tumble.
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Even facing such difficulties,ALPS succeeded in turning around in
fiscal1995, increasing its consolidated sales and profits as compared
with the previous year. One main reason of thissuccess was that the
company could make progress in overseas sales , although domestic
sales were stilldropping. In fiscal1995, the company's overseas sales
exceeded domestic sales for the first time. At the same time, the
company continued to boost overseas production. Another reason was
aggressive retrenchment in its organization.The company reduced its
employee count to two-thirds of its peak level in 1992 and reduced
types of components produced to one-tenth of their peak. Although
ALPS didn't drasticallychange its pricing to customers, the company
undertook a drasticrestructuring and retrenchment internally.
2. Restructuring and Retrenchment
(1) Restructuring: From Domestic to Overseas
During Japanese high economic growth in the 1960's,ALPS started
production in the Northeastern region of main island in Japan. At that
time, the company could procure inexpensive labor power, and other
production facilitiesin Tohoku which was a developing area in Japan.
Even now, a high percentage of ALPS' factoriesare located in this
region. The dominant logic at ALPS was "domestic production,
competition among factories"Each factory started production with only
one product and competition among these factorieswould drive ALPS
growth. Factories were allowed to expand their product lines as they
saw fit.Also, each factory had its own sales force. Therefore, the
company consisted of a loosely bound collection of entrepreneur
factories.However, this approach caused the company to fallbehind
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competitors who aggressively expanded overseas production. As a
result,the company also began to produce overseas in order to protect
itsleading position.Now, ALPS has 20 overseas production sites.Sales
due to overseas production rose from 23% of totalsalesin fiscal1992,
to 30% in fiscal1993, and is expected to exceed 50% in fiscal1996.
ALPS developed its overseas production adhering to the philosophy
"Made in Market", which meant that products soldin a market would
be manufactured in the same place.For example, the products sold in
China should be produced in China. However, according to this
philosophy, the allocation of the company's resources became
inefficient,because under this production system, the same product
was produced in various places.Presently,its strategy has been altered
to "Value-added products domestically, other standard products
overseas". In order to maximize efficiency,the company is currently
contemplating the optimal allocationof its production base.
(2) Retrenchment: Reduction of Types of Components and Em-
ployees
ALPS is a customer-oriented company. Therefore, in the bubble
economy, it expanded its product line according to customers' needs
without hesitation.For example, it produced all the various types of
VCR magnetic heads. Thus, after the collapse of the bubble economy,
the company planned to reduce component types from 100,000 to
one-tenth of that, with the vigorous cutting of unprofitable compo-
nents. By reducing component variety and focusing on profitable
components, the company feltit could realizehigher performance as a
whole.
However, they realized that it would take a long time to reduce
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component types. Therefore, the company changed its production
system while it continued to try to reduce the number of types of
components. At that time, the company was manufacturing using the
Just-In-Time (JIT) system. The JIT system was efficient only when
there was large volume of demand. Generally speaking, during the
recession, the volume of each component was such that JIT could not
be used efficiently. Thus, the company gave up the JIT system and
returned the traditional system, which called for some inventory on
hand for demand prediction. As a result, the new system brought the
higher efficiency to the product line.
Not only did ALPS dramatically cut component types, but it also
drastically cut labor by 3,239 employees from 12,749 in 1992 to 9,510 in
1995.
These efforts turned the company's consolidated performance
around. In fiscal 1995 alone, operating profit increased by 8.8 billionyen
as compared with the previous year. Although selling, general and
administrative expenses increased by 5.9 billion yen, an additional
increase in sales generated 5.8 billionyen of profit and cost retrench-
ment generated 8.9 billionyen. This cost retrenchment was the key to
ALPS increased operating profit in fiscal 1995.
3. Globalization for Turning Weakness into Strength
As ALPS is the leader of electric component manufactures in Japan,
its strategic actions seem to be slower than these of competitors.
However, facing the 90's recession, the company took more quick and
drastic steps than ever before. They retrenched aggressively in terms
of both production and labor. This retrenchment wad a "yellow-brick
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road" to performance turnaround.
We must look at another key action of this turnaround. This is that
the company has greatly expanded overseas production since the days
of bubble economy. ALPS got behind competitors in developing
overseas production bases, and was one of its main weaknesses.
Therefore, by accelerating globalization, and consolidating and improving
inferior overseas production sites, the company was able to attain vastly
improved performance. Its sails now full and ballast jettisoned, ALPS is
now turning past weakness into future strength.
Brief Conclusion
In this paper we have discussed strategies of the four Japanese
electronic component companies discussed above. Their strategies were
similar at a basic level, but there were noticeable differences caused by
their respective conditions of foundation, growth, technological basis,
customers and so forth. The traditional Japanese management system
acted as a backdrop for all of these aspects. The differences of
strategic behaviors among these companies, however, has become more
and more clear through the 90's recession.
The following is a discussion of the common factors of these
components manufacturers, and the strategic logic behind the
differences during and after the recession.
1. Strategies under the Recessionary Conditions
Basically, Japanese electronic component manufacturers have
developed new technologies and new components in accordance with
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the assembler's new-product development. Electronic components
define features of finished products. Technologically advanced
components have enabled finishedproducts, such as cassetterecorders,
VCRs, handy-cam recorders,compact disk players,and cellularphones
to achieve small size and high performance. Furthermore, low-prices
won through economies of scale have introduced and diffused new
products into markets. The current manifestation of thisphenomenon in
Japan can be seen through products such as cellularphones and
personal computers.
Component manufacturers have supplied variouscomponents in order
to satisfycustomer needs, that is the end-product assemblers' needs. It
is usual that they increase their types of components according to
customer's originalspecifications,and collaboratewith these customers
in research and development. Also, component manufacturers, following
end-product assemblers, have long since begun overseas production.
For example, in CD playersand TVs, overseas production exceeds 70%
of totalproduction.
In the component company-assembler relationshipas exists in the
Japanese electronicindustry, even in the case of Keiretsu relationships
such as NEC, Hitachi, Toshiba, and Panasonic, an assembler rarely
orders allof its components from one specified company. Rather, they
order components from multiple component manufacturers, a practice
called "multiple-ordering(Fukusu Hacchu)".
One reason why they adopt such a system of ordering is that it
prevents the risk of interrupting production lines, due to some
unforeseen accident during components delivery, a component
manufacturer's problem, conflictwith component manufacturers, and so
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on. A second, and more important reason, is that the practice enables
assemblers to lower prices, to heighten the quality of products, and to
ensure prompt delivery etc., through stimulating competition among
manufacturers. Multiple-ordering is particularly popular with assem-
blers. Thus, they have strengthened their bargaining power against the
component manufacturers by using multiple ordering strategically8'.
On the other hand, components manufacturers have strengthened
their position with respect to assemblers mainly by creating technolog-
ical advantages. It has become patently obvious that if a manufacturer
became the firstcomponent supplier with sophisticated technology, the
manufacturer could gain power in its relationships with assemblers.
However, if the level of technological advantage is not so high, the
component manufacturer could lose its competitive position, conse-
quently leading to downpricing. This is a reason why manufactures
such as TDK, Murata and Kyocera, which have high level material
technology, conceal the cost content and production process of their
products.
Furthermore, unique technology allows manufactures to expand their
customer base, and further enhance their bargaining power. In fact, the
four components manufacturers discussed in our paper have been able
to establish independent positions and to grow without entering into
the Keiretsu relationships, by expanding their product lines and heavily
investing in equipment and R&D during late 80's economic growth
period.
Nevertheless, it is not enough only to develop high-technology
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products. It is an indispensable factor to maintain a long-term stable
supply for components manufacturers. Indeed, technological advantages
and exclusive supply make it possible for a manufacturer to attain high
performance - if the competitors can not keep up. However, a large
amount of investment is needed to do so. Also, the component
manufacturer must ensure that large-sized assemblers do not have
incentive to develop and produce the core components internally. This
can be done through low prices and stable supply. If they cannot do
so, the component manufacturers have lost the significance of their
own existence. The reasons why most of the component manufacturers
give licenses and thus open their technologies to competitors, is to
alleviate the over-burdening of production lines, which can result from
the volume demands made necessary by the exclusive supply in a
rapidly changing environment.
Therefore, electronic components manufacturers have not only
developed technologies for attaining bargaining power in relation to
assemblers and competitive advantage, but also have realized a stable
supply and lowered products prices. Moreover, it is a primary factor
that the four companies discussed in our case-studies are implementing
corporate restructuring, including the fusing of product lines.
2. Evolution of Strategic Logic
The 90' recession, however, urges these companies to fundamental
change. They are required to evolve their traditional business logic
beyond a corporate restructuring. This means they must reevaluate the
strategic concept underlying the supply system, which we have pointed
out as "the reliabilityof supply" in our paper. It is different from the
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traditionallogic of the responsibilityof supply in compliance with
assemblers, that is "to supply with lower prices,fulllines of products
and also stability".Instead, it is the interpretation which views
reliabilityof supply from the standpoint of the components manufac-
turers.
For example, TDK is reforming its business system by translatingthe
reliabilityof supply though the concept of "back to materials", and
ROHM through the concept of "flexible production and supply
system". OMRON has overcome their crisis by interpreting the
reliabilityof supply though the concept "supply with consulting", and
ALPS through the concept of "optimal allocation of business
resources".
We can say, in conclusion, that these companies have not only
changed theirstrategiesthemselves during the recession,but also have
been evolving theirstrategiclogic.
We consider that there are some problems in our paper. For
example, as we discussed based on the case studies without quantative
research, we have yet to construct a general theory.In near future, we
hope to advance our research in thisarea.
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